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1LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
APPELLATE REVIEW OF EXCESSIVE SENTENCES
IN NON-CAPITAL CASES
The sentencing decision is perhaps the most overlooked stage in
our criminal justice process despite its great effect on the accused.
Lawyers and judges traditionally are concerned more with issues
arising from arrest, search and seizure, and confession. Once the
defendant's constitutional right to a "fair process" has been ensured,
the lawyers and judges often feel they have all but fulfilled their
roles; therefore, the actual sentencing decision is many times guided
by a perceived need for expediency.' This quick disposition from the
legal to the penal system, however, may result in an inadequate
measure of the defendant's culpability. Thus, if the criminal sentenc-
ing process is to maintain its integrity, an efficient system for the
review of excessive sentences is of vital importance.
Appellate review of criminal sentences is distinct from appellate
review of the defendant's conviction. Given the appropriate
statutory authority for sentence review, an appellate court can alter
the sentence imposed, but sentence review should never serve as a
substitute for the discretion of the trial judge: Its proper role is to
provide impartial guidelines to structure judicial discretion and to
eliminate the subjective methodology used in arriving at sentencing
conclusions. Nor should the review of sentences serve as a
utilitarian mechanism for imposing absolute equality for similar of-
fenders. "There is scope for legitimate and necessary moral varia-
tions in sentencing practice. The goal is individual propriety as well
as overall equity in sentencing practices."2 A functional sentencing
1. When the convicted defendant perceives his sentence as being unrelated to his
degree of culpability, the rehabilitative influence of that sentence is constrained. The
impact of sentencing policy on the prison population is significant and historically
documented.
The early 1900's, for example, had seen a series of prison riots across America.
Many viewed the long, fixed sentences meted out then as a contributing factor; it
was said that they left prisoners without hope .... "[Hjope" was instilled through
the medium of the indeterminate sentence ...
ITIhe very hope of the indeterminate sentence has now been recognized as
perpetuating a cruel uncertainty .... This ... situation has, moreover, undoubted-
ly contributed to many prison revolts.
J. KRESS, PRESCRIPTION FOR JUSTICE 30-31 (1980).
2. Id at 38. "[E]quality in punishment is not an absolute principle; . .. fit] is a
value to be weighed and considered among other values. . . . [Tlhere can be just
sentences in which like criminals are not treated alike, as to either who goes to prison
or for how long." Morris, Punishment, Desert and Rehabilitation, in SENTENCING 257,
257 (H. Gross & A. von Hirsch eds. 1981).
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guidelines system should control the abuse of discretion by
legislatively mandating sentencing principles and by developing a
practical and philosophical body of sentencing policies.'
The vehicles for sentence review vary in form from sentencing
panels to peer group commissions.' In the past the Louisiana
Supreme Court has been the body through which appeals of sen-
tence excessiveness had to pass, but the supreme court's case load
will be reduced when the lower appellate courts begin hearing
criminal appeals in July of 1982 pursuant to a constitutional amend-
ment.' While the constraints of time and economics may well be
relieved, the future effectiveness of the judiciary as a viable means
for controlling sentence disparity may be curtailed correspondingly
if the appellate courts' application of sentencing policies becomes in-
cohesive. This note will examine the historical evolution of sentence
review in Louisiana, provide interpretations of the jurisprudence
and the objective policy considerations therein, and finally suggest
alternatives to Louisiana's sentencing guidelines system.
The Power to Review Excessive Sentences
The eighth amendment to the United States Constitution, pro-
hibiting the infliction of "cruel and unusual punishments," is tradi-
tionally thought to preclude punishment which is cruel and unusual
in form or substance. However, there is authority for the proposi-
tion that the eighth amendment prohibits excessive lengths of im-
prisonment as well. As early as 1892 some members of the judiciary
adamantly maintained that the eighth amendment served as a
safeguard "not only against punishments of the character men-
tioned, but against all punishments which by their excessive length
or severity are greatly disproportioned to the offenses charged."'
3. The legislature's responsibility is to set criminal sanctions acceptable to the
electorate. The judiciary, as an interpreter of constitutional rights, must then conform
the sentencing practices to correct for legislative overreaching. "When the legislature
determines sentencing ranges, it is operating at a level of abstraction far removed
from individual case dispositions .... At that level of abstraction the symbolic quality
of the criminal sanction is of great importance." Zimring, Making. the Punishment Fit
the Crime. A Consumer's Guide to Sentencing Reform, in SENTENCING 327, 332 (H.
Gross & A. von Hirsch eds. 1981).
4. See text at notes 96-99, infra.
5. See LA. CONST. art. V, § 10 (amended 1980).
6. O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323, 339-40 (1892) (Field, J., dissenting). "The
whole inhibition is against that which is excessive either in bail required, or find im-
posed, or punishment inflicted." Id. at 340. Compare Justice Field's opinion, id at
339-40 (Field. J., dissenting) with the Court's assessment, authored by Justice Rehn-
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This interpretation of the eighth amendment was strengthened a
few years later when the United States Supreme Court announced a
theory of proportioning the punishment to the offender and the of-
fense in Weems v. United States! The defendant in Weems was con-
victed under Philippine law of falsifying a public document. His
sentence of fifteen years included various stringent and painful con-
ditions of imprisonment;8 in addition, numerous accessory penalties
extended beyond the period of incarceration. The Supreme Court
held that the statute under which the defendant was sentenced was
"repugnant to the bill of rights"9 and accordingly reversed the judg-
ment of conviction. While the criminal statute itself and not the
sentence imposed thereunder was declared unconstitutional, the im-
plicit holding of Weems nevertheless evidenced a broader inter-
pretation of eighth amendment protections.0
The Weems doctrine may be of questionable import in future
eighth amendment challenges in light of the recent Supreme Court
pronouncement in Rummel v. Estelle." The defendant in Rummel.
challenged the constitutionality of a mandatory life sentence, im-
posed under a Texas recidivist statute. The Supreme Court conclud-
ed that the state legislation served substantial state interests and
did not impose cruel and unusual punishment. The precise holding in
Rummel is unclear; its impact on the eighth amendment dispropor-
tionality doctrine is not fully cognizable. Future Supreme Court
decisions may constrain the application of Rummel to only recidivist
statutes; however, lower federal courts have interpreted Rummel to
quist, in Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 272-74 (1980). See also Dressier, Substantive
Criminal Law Through the Looking Glass of Rummel v. Estelle: Proportionality and
Justice as Endangered Doctrines, 34 S.W.L.J. 1063, 1089 (1981).
7. 217 U.S. 349 (1910).
8. The defendant's punishment included a sentence of twelve years in chains and
at "hard and painful labor," the loss of numerous civil rights, civil interdiction.
perpetual absolute disqualification from' enjoying political rights, and lifetime
surveillance. Id. at 364-65.
9. ld. at 382.
10. In light of the lower courts' assessment of Weems, this statement seems fac-
tually accurate. "[Llower courts, relying on Weems, were deciding excessive punish-
ment cases by assessing the proportionality of prison sentences not only as they
related to offenses in the abstract, but also as applied to the circumstances of par-
ticular offenders." Gardner, The Determinate Sentencing Movement and the Eighth
Amendment: Excessive Punishment Before and After Rummel v. Estelle, 1980 DUKE
L.J. 1103, 1119.
11. 445 U.S. 263 (1980). For a discussion of the possible implications of Rumme
see Dressier, supra note 6; Schwartz, Eighth Amendment Proportionality Analysis
and the Compelling Case of William Rummel, 71 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 378 (1980).
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preclude eighth amendment disproportionality challenges to
sentences.12 The disproportionality jurisprudence prior to Rummel is
limited, but this lack of jurisprudence in no way suggests that the
Weems rationale was not a viable constitutional doctrine."3
Moreover, Weems may continue as valid precedent as some com-
mentators have suggested that "Rummel did not overrule Weems."'"
In Louisiana, it is unlikely that Rummel will have any effect. The
present sentence review system is based on state constitutional
guarantees which are more protective than the eighth amendment.'5
Dependence on state constitutional provisions represents a "bold"'
step by the Louisiana courts towards reform of the sentencing pro-
cess.
An historical breakdown of the Louisiana courts' interpretations
of state and federal constitutional prohibitions against cruel and
unusual punishment reveals a reluctance to recognize any constitu-
tional power to review a sentence for excessiveness. Early state con-
stitutions contained verbatim reproductions of the federal eighth
12. See, e.g., Francioni v. Wainwright, _.._F.2d (5th Cir. 1981). For a discus-
sion of the proportionality analysis used by the federal and state courts prior to Rum-
mel see Hart v. Coiner, 483 F.2d 136 (4th Cir. 1973); Chapman v. Pickett, 491 F. Supp.
967, 974 (C.D. Ill. 1980); In re Foss, 10 Cal. 3d 910, 519 P.2d 1073, 112 Cal. Rptr. 649
(1974); In re Lynch, 8 Cal. 3d 410, 503 P.2d 921, 105 Cal. Rptr. 217, (1972); Workman v.
Commonwealth, 429 S.W.2d 374 (Ky. 1968); People v. Lorentzne, 387 Mich. 167, 194
N.W.2d 827 (1972). Proportionality analysis in the fifth circuit is highlighted in Ter-
rebonne v. Blackburn, 6 F.2d 997 (5th Cir. 1981). See also authorities citied in note 11,
supra.
13. The willingness of lower courts to examine prison sentences under the
analysis emerging from Weems . .. has not resulted in frequent findings of ex-
cessive punishment. Indeed, [the disproportionality cases) are extremely rare even
though the courts are constantly petitioned to overturn allegedly excessive
sentences. The lower appellate courts have cautiously applied proportionality
analysis to prison sentencesi routinely deferring to legislative and sentencing-
court decisions regarding the appropriate degrees of punishment for given of-
fenses and offenders. That sentences are rarely overturned as excessive,
however, in no way lessens the necessity of judicial review as a check on unduly
harsh punishments.
Gardner, supra note 10, at 1124.
14. "Rummel did not overrule Weems. It is still a precept of justice that punish-
ment be proportionate to the severity of the offense." Dessler, supra note 6, at 1117.
See Pugh & Radamaker, A Plea for Greater Judicial Control Over Sentencing and
Abolition of the Present Plea Bargaining System, 42 LA. L. REv. 79 (1981).
15. See Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. at 303-04 (Powell, J. dissenting), and authori-
ty cited in note 16, infra.
16. See Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights. 90
HARV. L. REV. 489 (1977).
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amendment." Because state courts can give different interpretations
to their own state constitutions where the wording is identical to
federal constitutional protections, Louisiana courts could have
reviewed sentences for excessiveness under the early state constitu-
tional provisions. 8 Hence, the Louisiana courts could have used the
proportionality doctrine of Weems and reviewed sentences for ex-
cessiveness and disproportionality.19  The continual growth of
disproportionality case law within the federal courts parallels the
period of indifference which existed within Louisiana's state courts."0
When the new state constitution was adopted in 1974, the pro-
hibition against cruel and unusual punishment was altered material-
ly. The new provision provides that "[njo law shall subject any per-
son to euthanasia, to torture, or to cruel, excessive, or unusual
punishment.""1 The ban on excessive punishment was a significant
addition and provided the catalyst to initiate appellate review of ex-
orbitant sentences. The addition of the word "excessive" was
thought to grant the Louisiana Supreme Court the power to review
sentences notwithstanding the fact that the sanctions were imposed
17. The state constitution has had prohibitions against cruel forms of punishment
since 1812. The prohibitions have been directed at either "cruel or unusual punish-
ment" or "cruel and unusual punishment." See LA. CONST. art. 1, § 12 (1921) ("and");
LA. CONST. art. 12 (1913) ("and"); LA. CONST. art. 12 (1898) ("and"); LA. CONST. art. 8
(1868) ("or"); LA. CONST. art. 107 (1864) ("and"). See generally LA. CONST. art. 9 (1879);
LA. CONST. art. 104 (1852); LA. CONST. art. 108 (1845); LA. CONST. art. 6, § 19 (1812).
Both the 1864 and 1868 constitutions contained provisions requiring that "all penalties
shall be proportioned to the nature of the offence." See LA. CONST. art. 102 (1868); LA.
CONST. art. 94 (1864).
18. See Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 303-04 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting);
Brennan, supra note 16. See also the discussion in note 24, infra, and accompanying
text.
19. See notes 6 & 7. 8upra. The Louisiana Supreme Court regressed slightly, to a
position that saw state constitutional prohibitions of cruel and unusual punishment as
only applicable to the form or character of the punishment. The court's assessment of
the law in State v. Staub, 182 La. 1040, 162 So. 766 (1935). is incorrect insofar as it fail-
ed to recognize Weems. See also State v. Thomas, 224 La. 431, 69 So. 2d 738 (1953).
The renewed significance of Weems in the seventies can be described as a product of
penological and social reform. Decisions like Staub and similar ones in other states
were a result of temporal concerns favoring incarceration which were less prevalent in
the late sixties and the early seventies.
20. During the seventies the federal courts and several state courts were refining
various proportionality tests based on the eighth amendment to review sentences in
both capital and non-capital cases. See, e.g., Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977);
Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976); Davis v. Davis, 601 F.2d 153 (4th Cir.
1979); Rummel v. Estelle, 568 F.2d 1193 (5th Cir. 1978). aff'd, 445 U.S. 263 (1980);
Downey v. Perini, 518 F.2d 1288 (6th Cir. 1975); and authorities cited in note 12, supra.
21. LA. CONST. art. 1, § 20 (emphasis added).
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within legislatively prescribed ranges... In his concurring opinion in
State v. Williams Justice Tate stated:
The corollary provision of the previous Louisiana Constitution of
1921, article I Section 12, tracks the wording of the Eighth
Amendment. Given the prior Louisiana constitution and the
classic language of the Eighth Amendment to the United States
Constitution, the addition of the word 'excessive'-as applying
to all punishments and not limited to fines-must be considered
intentional, expanding of the prior law, and significant.u
From the 1900's to the mid-1970's the Louisiana judiciary did not
engage ambitiously in the review of criminal sentences;"4 however,
in the late seventies a minority of the justices opined that under the
authority of the 1974 Constitution the supreme court had the power
to vacate a constitutionally excessive penalty." The supreme court's
hesitancy to exercise this power echoed the majority's belief that
the entire sentencing process should be consigned to the sole discre-
tion of the trial judge."
22. See the concurring opinions of Justice Tate in State v. Williams, 340 So. 2d
1382, 1384 (La. 1976) and State v. Bryant, 325 So. 2d 255, 265 (La. 1975). Justice Mar-
cus believed that the 1974 constitution authorized the judiciary to review only the con-
stitutionality of the sentence range as mandated by the legislature. See State v.
Sepulvado, 367 So. 2d 762, 773 (La. 1978) (Marcus, J., dissenting); State v. McClinton,
329 So. 2d 676, 678 (La. 1976) (Marcus, J., concurring). See also Hargrave, The Declara-
tion of Rights of the Louisiana Constitution of 1974, 35 LA. L. REv. 1, 62 (1978);
Jenkins, The Declaration of Rights, 21 Loy. L. REV. 9, 39 (1975).
23. 340 So. 2d 1382, 1385 (La. 1977) (Tate, J., concurring). Louisiana prosecutors
were less likely to agree with this position.
The state strongly urges to this Court that excessive punishment is and
always has been considered cruel and unusual under the proscription of the 1921
Louisiana Constitution and of constitutions in other jurisdictions. [The state]
argues, therefore, that the addition of the word excessive in the 1974 Constitution
does not add anything to the law.
State v. Whitehurst, 319 So. 2d 907, 909 n.1 (La. 1975).
24. "The determination of the sentence is the prerogative of the trial judge. As
long as the sentence falls within the limits authorized by the Louisiana Criminal Code.
this Court has no authority to review it." State v. Polk, 258 La. 738, 752, 247 So. 2d
853, 858 (1971) (citations omitted). See also State v. Pebworth, 260 La. 647, 257 So. 2d
136 (1972).
25. See State v. Mallery, 364 So. 2d 1283, 1285 (La. 1978) (Tate, J., dissenting);
State v. Terrebonne, 364 So. 2d 1290, 1293 (La. 1978) (Calogero, J., concurring); State
v. Skyes, 364 So. 2d 1293, 1298 (La. 1978) (Tate, J., dissenting); and authorities cited in
note 22, supra.
26. The Louisiana courts were bound by the provisions of article 878 of the Loui.
siana Code of Criminal Procedure. "A sentence shall not be set aside on the ground
that it inflicts cruel or unusual punishment unless the statute under which it is impos-
ed is found unconstitutional." "The above article ... is designed to preclude attacks on
19821 1085
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Those jurists in favor of reviewing sentences for excessiveness
were concerned that undisclosed sentencing factors would not be
ascertainable from the appellate record. 7 In partial response to
these misgivings the legislature enacted limited sentencing
guidelines, both to assist the trial judge in personalizing the
sentence and to preserve the sentencing considerations for the ap-
pellate record.2 This legislative process resulted in a codification of
past sentencing practices pronounced in new article 894.1 of the
Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure. Article 894.1 sets out three
aggravating factors which may necessitate a sentence of imprison-
ment; however, it also lists eleven possible mitigating factors which
should be considered in determining if probation is the more ap-
propriate alternative." Section C of article 894.1 is a mandatory pro-
vision requiring the trial judge to "state for the record the con-
siderations taken into account and the factual basis therefor in im-
posing [the] sentence."0 The new guidelines do not purport to
restrict the discretion of a trial judge, but are "aids that enable in-
dividual judges better to structure and articulate their own judicial
discretion."' The effectiveness of article 894.1 requires judges "to
the nature and severity of sentences imposed unless the law upon which the conviction
and sentence is based is found unconstitutional." LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 878, comment
(a). However, if there was a constitutional guarantee of proportionate sentences within
the cruel and unusual punishment prohibition, then the legislature would have no
authority to enact such a provision. See Corey v. United States, 375 U.S. 169, 171 n.3
(1963); Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225, 230 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
27. See State v. Mallery, 364 So. 2d 1283, 1288 n.5 (La. 1978) (Tate, J., dissenting).
See also Hart v. Coiner, 483 F.2d 136, 149 n.2 (4th Cir. 1973) (Boremen, J., dissenting);
Note, Appellate Review of Sentences and the Need for A Reviewable Record, 1973
DUKE L.J. 1357.
28. See LA. CODE CalM. P. art. 894.1. See generally Note, Appellate Review of
Sentences: A New Standard in Louisiana, 39 LA. L. REV. 1172 (1979).
29. The aggravating factors include the risk of the defendant committing another
crime, or the defendant's "need [for custodial] correctional treatment," or the belief
that a "lesser sentence [would] deprecate the seriousness of the defendant's crime."
LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 894.1(A). The various mitigating factors include, for example,
victim provocation, restitution by the defendant, the defendant's lack of a prior
criminal record, and the defendant's character. LA. CODE CraM. P. art. 894.1().
30. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 894.1(C).
31. J. KRESS, supra note 1, at 9.
[Slentencing guidelines systems help trial court judges to secure equity in sen-
tencing practices-by achieving conscious and conscientious consistency over time
and over an entire court system-and also to secure propriety in sentencing prac-
tices-by subjecting both case-by-case and policy decisions to constructive and in-
formed internal and external review. Individual sentencing guidelines thus supply
nonmandatory guidance and discretion to judges-a starting point, as it were, for
informed sentencing.
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reach [a] consensus on what their policy should be and then to struc-
ture their discretion consistent with it."8 Article 894.1 was never in-
tended to wholly eliminate sentencing descretion, but was intended
only to act as a mechanism for unifying sentencing policy.8
The judicial proclivity to recognize a state constitutional man-
date against excessive penalties had matured commensurate with a
legislative provision preserving the sentencing considerations for
appellate review. To justify the court's role as the agency' for con-
trolling sentencing standards required only the appropriate case.
State v. Sepulvado"5 provided the opportune factual setting to
implement sentence review in non-capital cases." Frankie Sepulvado
was convicted of carnal knowledge of a juvienile7 and sentenced to
serve three and one-half years at hard labor."' The Louisiana
Supreme Court originally affirmed the defendant's conviction but
vacated the sentence because the district court failed to comply
with the provisions of Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure article
894.1-the judge did not provide written reasons for the sentence
imposed." On remand, in complying with article 894.1, the trial court
related its factual basis for once again imposing the three and one-
half year prison term." On subsequent appeal, the supreme court
held "that the imposition of a sentence, although within the
32. Gottfredson, Sentencing Guidelines, in SENTENCING 310, 311 (H. Gross & A.
von Hirsch eds. 1981).
Historically, broad, standardless discretion was linked to a rehabilitative
idealogy: the sentencing judge and the parole board were thought to require wide
leeway, in order to tailor the individual offender's penalty to his or her "need for
treatment." The current revival of interest in standards or guidelines has coincid-
ed with growing doubts about the fairness and efficacy of rehabilitatively oriented
sentencing.
SENTENCING, supra, at 303 (editorial comments).
33. See State v. Sepulvado, 367 So. 2d 762, 767-69 (La. 1979).
34. See text at note 97, infra.
35. 367 So. 2d 762 (La. 1979).
36. The Louisiana legislature had previously taken steps in 1976 to provide for ap-
pellate review in capital cases. See LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 905.1; Note, Capital Sentencing
Review Under Supreme Court Rule 28, 42 LA. L. REV. 1100 (1981).
37. CRIMINAL CODE: LA. R.S. 14:80 (1950).
38. The defendant was eighteen years old and the girl involved was fifteen years
of age. They had known each other for over four years. Apparently the two had plan-
ned to run away together because the girl's parents had refused to give her permission
to marry the defendant. "Nothing in the record suggests that their sexual act was
anything other than the voluntary act of two equally willing and infatuated teenagers."
367 So. 2d at 764.
39. State v. Sepulvado, 359 So. 2d 137 (La. 1978).
40. 367 So. 2d at 763.
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statutory limit, may violate a defendant's constitutional right
against excessive punishment."" The supreme court also found that
the constitutional right was enforceable on appellate review of his
conviction."2 In reaching this conclusion the supreme court empha-
sized that imprisonment is not necessarily obligatory when an ag-
gravating factor exists under article 894.1.'" The presence of
mitigating factors properly may indicate that suspension or proba-
tion is the more acceptable alternative." The court used an inter-
jurisdictional'" and an intrajurisdictional'" analysis of other
sentences imposed for the same crime as empirical proof of the
defendant's excessive sentence. By examining the sentencing prac-
tices of other judicial districts within the state, the supreme court
was more able to recognize the disparate treatment to which
Frankie Sepulvado had been subjected.
Through Sepulvado, the sentence review process was placed
within the hands of the Louisiana Supreme Court. The supreme
court's role in sentence review has predominantly developed
through evolving standards within Louisiana's own state constitu-
tion rather than through reliance on the proscriptions of the federal
eighth amendment. Nevertheless, the safeguards afforded by
sentence review exist in a symbiotic relationship with the federal
constitutional rights guaranteed to all criminal defendants.'7
41. Id. at 767.
42. Id.
43. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 894.1(A).
44. 367 So. 2d at 769.
45. Id. at 768 nn. 5 & 6.
46. Id. at 772-73. The step-by-step analytical process used in Sepulvado shows a
remarkable similarity to the lower federal courts' proportionality tests. See the discus-
sion of federal proportionality tests at note 20, supra, and the cases cited therein.
47. See generally United States v. McCord, 466 F.2d 17 (2d Cir. 1972); Simon v.
Woodson, 454 F.2d 161 (5th Cir. 1972); Meyer v. United States, 446 F.2d 37 (2d Cir.
1971). Justice Rehnquist acknowledged the uniqueness of the death penalty and viewed
those cases as inapplicable to William Rummel's eighth amendment claim. Rummel v.
Estelle, 445 U.S. at 272. Historically, the protections afforded defendants in capital
cases have always paved the way for similar measures applied to non-capital cases.
The justices of the Supreme Court have specifically and repeatedly declared
the death penalty to be unique. Therefore, it may be contended that the constitu-
tional standards and concerns established in the death penalty cases are neither
applicable nor capable of extrapolation to other sentencing decisions. Never-
theless, legal history records that many of the procedural rights now guaranteed
to all criminal defendants were first won by those facing capital sentencing.
J. KRESS, supra note 1, at 63. See Note, Capital Sentencing Review Under Supreme Court
Rule 28, 42 LA. L. REV. 1100 (1981).
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Louisiana's Sentencing Guidelines System
In the aftermath of Sepulvado, the Louisiana Supreme Court has
reviewed hundreds of criminal sentences. Although the cases are
numerous, the precedental value of the jurisprudence is still
somewhat limited. However, the sentence review process used by
the supreme court is structured and well defined."' If the trial judge
has failed to articulate the methodology of the sentencing decision,
then the supreme court will remand the case with instructions to
comply with article 894.1. 4" In the event that the appellate record is
complete, i.e., the trial judge has set out the factual basis for the
sentence imposed, the supreme court can review the constitutionali-
ty of the penalty. Hence, the supreme court enforces the legislative
guidelines by remanding sentences to comply with article 894.1 and
reconciles sentence disparity by the modification of excessive penal
sanctions.
The Judicial Use of Article 894.1
Many sentences cannot be reviewed because the record does not
disclose the articulated facts upon which the sentence was based.
Absent a factual basis for the sentence, the case is remanded to
comply with article 894.1.1 On remand to articulate the sentencing
factors, the trial judge could conclude independently that the
original sentence was excessive. A lesser sentence can be imposed
by the trial court, and the defendant may or may not exercise his
right to appeal. The number of sentences reduced in this manner is
not known.5
48. While in certain contexts the court articulates a principle, or series of princi-
ples, in a systematic manner, it is frequently necessary to identify the operative
principles from the examination of a considerable number of cases, none of which
specifically identifies the relevant criteria, but which, when viewed collectively,
clearly conform substantially to a pattern which can be described.
D. THOMAS, PRINCIPLES OF SENTENCING 5 (2d ed. 1979).
49. See text at note 30, supra.
50. See, e.g., State v. Jones, 386 So.2d 85 (La. 1980); State v. Kenner, 384 So. 2d
413 (La. 1980); State v. Dye, 384 So. 2d 420 (La. 1980); State v. Martin, 372 So. 2d 563
(La. 1979); State v. Terriault, 369 So. 2d 125 (La. 1979); State v. Volk, 369 So. 2d 128
(La. 1979); State v. Gist, 369 So. 2d 1339 (La. 1979); State v. Roper, 364 So. 2d 1308 (La.
1978).
51. In State v. Jacobs, 383 So. 2d 342 (La. 1980), the defendant received a lesser
sentence on resentencing and appealed that sentence as also being excessive. The
supreme court affirmed the sentence without hesitation, which probably suggests that
the court would be less inclined to find a sentence constitutionally excessive when the
trial judge, in his discretion, had lowered the sentence on remand.
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If disparity in sentencing is to be curtailed, then article 894.1
must be used effectively at the trial stage. Often a trial judge will
give only a verbatim recitation of the provisions of article 894.1
without incorporating the facts of the case which support the penal-
ty.52 On appeal, the supreme court must remand, because the record
does not provide sufficient documentation to determine if the
sentence was excessive.
However, in a very limited number of cases the court is able to
review the excessiveness issue despite the trial judge's failure to
comply with article 894.1. In State v. Jones,3 the defendant was con-
victed of armed robbery and was sentenced to fifteen years hard
labor without benefit of probation, parole or suspension of sentence.
Although the trial judge failed to comply with the mandatory re-
quirements of article 894.1, the supreme court nevertheless affirmed
the conviction and sentence. The court reasoned that because the
defendant's sentence was in the lower range of possible sentences it
was not an "apparently severe" sentence." In State v. Day,"5 the
defendant was convicted of aggravated burglary and attempted sim-
ple rape and was sentenced to consecutive terms totaling forty-two
and one-half years. The trial judge failed to state the factual basis
for the sentence, but the supreme court still found no merit in the
defendant's assignment of error concerning his punishment."
52. See State v. Kenner, 384 So. 2d 413 (La. 1980); State v. Little, 377 So. 2d 332
(La. 1979). In State v. Fields, 394 So. 2d 597 (La. 1981), the defendant was convicted of
attempted theft after he used a credit card from a wallet he had allegedly found. In im-
posing a six month prison term, the trial judge used a "check-off' form listing the ag-
gravating and mitigating circumstances outlined by article 894.1. On appeal the
supreme court remanded for resentencing because the trial judge failed to articulate a
factual basis for the sentence. However, in a concurring opinion, Justice Lemmon
noted that the use of a standardized form was allowable if the factual basis for the
sentence was included on the form. 394 So. 2d at 598 (Lemmon, J., concurring).
However, the use of a' standardized form could lead to a less thoughtful and reasoned
articulation of the basis for the sentence imposed.
It is imperative that *the reasons not simply be an expression of something
already contained in the guidelines or some phrase made meaningless through
rote repetition ... but that they instead be a thoughtful and "reasoned" justifica-
tion as to why the guideline sentence is inappropriate for the case at hand. A
judge may still refer to an item in the guidelines, but rather than merely state
the obvious-that the particular item was considered-the judge should explain
why a different weighing was given to the item.
J. KRESS, supra note 1, at 40.
53. 381 So. 2d 416 (La. 1980).
54. Id. at 418-19.
55. 391 So. 2d 1147 (La. 1980).
56. "ITlhere seems little justification for a remand for resentencing when the
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Both defendants, Jones and Day, engaged in criminal conduct
where an individual was or could have been harmed. The continuing
trend of the court seems to be to affirm those criminal sentences
where the propensity of victim harm is unusually high, aside from
questions of the trial judge's compliance with article 894.1.7 The
courts apparently favor a policy of deterrence over rehabilitative
measures when sentencing defendants convicted of violent crimes.
The desire to perpetuate a "deterrent" penal philosophy may justify
the supreme court's "hands-off" policy toward cases involving victim
harm." Indeed, cases of violent crimes are presently the only
judicial exception which permits a sentence to be upheld on appeal
despite the fact that the sentencing rationale was not included in
the record as required by article 894.1.11
record so plainly supports the sentence imposed. In the interest of judicial economy,
we decline to remand to require the trial court to restate for the record matters which
are already apparent from the record." Id. at 1151.
57. But see State v. Cox, 369 So. 2d 118 (La. 1979), where the defendant's convic-
tions for armed robbery and attempted murder were affirmed, but the case was
remanded to clarify the reasons for imposing consecutive sentences. For the latest
statement by the court on the use of consecutive sentences see State v. Molinario, 400
So. 2d 596 (La. 1981).
58. Negligent conduct considered criminal, such as negligent injuring or criminal
neglect of family, are situations where victim injury may occur but incarceration of the
defendant will have neither a deterrent effect nor a rehabilitative influence.
Retributive sentencing in these types of victim injury cases "makes no measureable
contribution to acceptable goals of punishment and hence is nothing more than the pur-
poseless and needless imposition of pain and suffering." Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584,
592 (1977). Accord, State v. Williams, - So. 2d - (La. 1981); State v. Goode, 380
So. 2d 1361 (La. 1980). Two examples of retributive sentencing were recently affirmed
by the supreme court. In State v. Daranda, 398 So. 2d 1053 (La. 1981), the defendant
was sentenced to five years imprisonment for negligent homicide. The defendant ad-
mittedly was intoxicated when the accident occurred, but had no prior DWI convic-
tions, had been steadily employed, and lacked the intent to inflict serious harm. Only
Justice Dennis was of the opinion that probation or a lesser sentence would have been
appropriate. Id. at 1057 (Dennis, J., dissenting). In State v. Scott, 400 So. 2d 627 (La.
1981), the defendant was convicted of cruelty to a juvenile. The defendant's negligent
failure to provide his son with appropriate medical care after an accidental injury was
the proximate cause of the child's death. The five year sentence was affirmed by the
court with only one justice dissenting. The majority's concerns over the welfare of the
other children could have been solved by more logical means than the incarceration of
the defendant.
59. One case, not involving victim harm, was affirmed notwithstanding the lower
court's omission of the sentencing guidelines in article 894.1. In State v. Russell, 397
So. 2d 1319 (La. 1981), the defendant was convicted of receiving stolen property as the
result of an extensive police "sting" operation. The trial judge made no specific appli-
cation of Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure article 894.1 in arriving at the defend-
ant's three and one-half year sentence; nevertheless, the supreme court affirmed. The
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Declaring a Sentence Excessive
When the primary sentencing decision is within the parameters
of article 894.1, the supreme court can exercise its role as a review
mechanism. Although the practitioner can learn a great deal from
those sentences determined to be excessive as much, if not more,
can be learned from the sentences which are affirmed on appeal. Only
a very small percentage of the sentences appealed to the supreme
court are adjudicated excessive. A sentence set aside as excessive
must reveal a "manifest abuse of discretion" on the part of the trial
judge."
As previously noted, almost all sentences imposed on violent of-
fenders are affirmed. 1 In fact, only recently has the Louisiana
Supreme Court held that a prescribed sentence for a violent of-
fender was constitutionally excessive."2 Even in cases where the
defendant committed a non-violent crime, the supreme court is less
apt to find the sentence excessive unless the facts reveal the
presence of unique circumstances and the sentence imposed ap-
proaches the legislative maximum. 3 In State v. Grider4 , the defen-
presence of an overriding public concern to break-up this illegal activity which 'was
economically burdensome to the business community probably outweighed any policies
favoring a remand for resentencing to comply with article 894.1. However, the unique
facts of this case do not warrant its characterization as an additional "exception." See
notes 61 & 79, infra.
60. See State v. Molinario, 400 So. 2d 596 (La. 1981); State v. Jacobs, 383 So. 2d
342 (La. 1980); State v. Spencer, 374 So. 2d 1195 (La. 1979).
61. See, e.g., State v. Bates, 397 So. 2d 1331 (La. 1980); State v. Reed, 396 So. 2d
1316 (La. 1981); State v. Thomas, 395 So. 2d 802 (La. 1981); State v. Brown, 395 So. 2d
1301 (La. 1981); State v. Douglas, 389 So. 2d 1263 (La. 1980); State v. Napier, 385 So. 2d
776 (La. 1980); State v. Stegall, 377 So. 2d 103 (La. 1979); State v. Bell, 377 So. 2d 275
(La. 1979); State v. Carthan, 377 So. 2d 308 (La. 1979). See also State v. Upton, 396 So.
2d 1309 (La. 1981), and State v. Franks, 391 So. 2d 1133 (La. 1980), where the cases
were remanded a second time to state the factual basis for increasing the penalty on
resentencing.
62. See State v. Williams, - So. 2d - (La. 1981), and text at notes 90-94
supra.
63. The factual situation in Sepulvado represented these outer extremities. The
court made a distinction between cases of "exploitation of an immature girl by an older
man ... and ... displays of mutual affection between adolescents." 367 So. 2d at 768
n.5 (quoting D. THOMAS, supra note 48, at 113). Where both individuals are adolescents
probation or a suspended sentence are more desirable penal sanctions. See text at note
35, supra.
In State v. Clark, 391 So. 2d 1174 (La. 1980) and State v. Wright, 384 So. 2d 399
(La. 1980), the defendants were convicted of theft of livestock. Both defendants com-
mitted the theft prior to the effective date of a legislative amendment lowering the
penal sanction for the crime. Although constitutionally the defendants could be
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dant was convicted of simple escape and sentenced to the maximum
possible penalty of five years. The supreme court rescinded the
sentence because of its excessiveness, and stated that the maximum
sentence should be reserved for circumstances which "approach the
outer limits of egregious escape."' Similarly, the defendant in State
v. Jones" pled guilty to attempted distribution of marijuana after
making a twelve dollar sale to an undercover police officer.
Although the defendant had no previous record of dealing in contra-
band, his five year prison term was the maximum possible sentence.
The propriety of the defendant's plea bargain was a collateral issue
which unquestionably influenced the court; nevertheless, the
supreme court abrogated the sentence due to its excessiveness. 7
These two cases indicate the trend of appellate review in Louisiana:
The supreme court will seldom vacate a non-maximum sentence.
Individuals convicted of drug offenses comprise the major
percentage of cases where a sentence is found constitutionally ex-
cessive. The recent efforts to decriminalize certain drugs and the
availability of community drug abuse programs may be evidence of
a less draconian social attitude toward these activities. The supreme
court, when reviewing these sentences, might be attempting to
reconcile social demands with outdated legislative penalties. After
concluding that the defendant in State v. Tilley"' was only a "small
fish" involved in the distribution of cocaine, the supreme court held
that his twenty-one year sentence was excessive when compared
with other sentences imposed in recent drug cases. The defendant in
sentenced under the old statute, the supreme court believed that the sentences were
nevertheless excessive. A lesser sentence would not deprecate the seriousness of the
crime based on the empirical evaluation of the sentencing range later provided by the
Louisiana legislature.
64. 380 So. 2d 611 (La. 1980).
65. Id. at 613.
66. 398 So. 2d 1049 (La. 1981).
67. On the original appeal, the case was remanded to comply with Louisiana Code
of Criminal Procedure article 894.1. See State v. Jones, 386 So. 2d 85 (La. 1980). The
trial judge imposed the same sentence, and the supreme court, on the second appeal,
found that it was excessive. 398 So. 2d 1049 (La. 1981). In contrast, the defendant in
State v. Jacobs, 383 So. 2d 342 (La. 1980), received a lesser sentence on remand; he
had been convicted of distribution and possession of marijuana, and the supreme court
affirmed. The original maximum sentence possibly could have been found to be exces-
sive, especially in light of the publicity surrounding the case.- Moreover, the publicity
factor is one variable which leads to "retributive" sentences. See State v. Forshee, 395
So. 2d 742 (La. 1981). and note 58. aupra.
68. 400 So. 2d 1363 (La. 1981).
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State v. Bonanno " received an identical twenty-one year prison term
for distribution of cocaine; yet he intended "to open a large new co-
caine market in the Shreveport area.""0 Bonanno's sentence was af-
firmed and in comparison revealed the inequity inherent in Tilley's
sentence."' The court, absent the needed legislative guide, continual-
ly has distinguished between the profit motive of the small operator
and the large-scale drug dealer."
First offenders are in the unique position of being able to
challenge the trial judge's choice of incarceration. The value
judgments underlying the choice between a prison term and in-
dividualized probation represent conflicting penal objectives.
Although the choice of incarceration may constitute reversible error
enforceable on appeal, the argument has thus far only been sug-
gested in drug cases. In State v. Saunders,"8 the supreme court
stated in dicta that the trial court erred in not placing the defendant
in a drug rehabilitation program;"' the defendant had been given a
four year term for "altering a prescription."" Concededly, ex-
tenuating factors were present in Saunders," but dicta in State v.
Tilley suggest that the argument still has judicial appeal.
While [the] defendant, as a first offender, would be ejigible for
probation, we are not prepared to say that it was error to im-
pose a prison sentence and not suspend it and place defendant
on supervised probation. However, the fact that he did register
and continued to attend the drug abuse clinic indicated that
defendant is amenable to the idea, at least, of treatment and
rehabilitation."
The choice of penal objectives is made by the trial court after an
assessment of the elements of public policy. If the only concern was
69. 384 So. 2d 355 (La. 1980).
70. Id. at 357.
71. Roy Tilley was also a young offender, had a stable employment record, had
responded to rehabilitation; and supported a physically disabled mother. On the other
hand, Bonnano's profit motive was totally based on self-support. 400 So. 2d at 1367-68.
72. "[A] sentence must be proportional to the offense unless we are willing to say
that individual drug traffickers may constitutionally be punished for the social harm
caused by the drug traffic as a whole." Note, Disproportionality in Sentence of Im-
prisonment, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1119, 1145 (1979). See Terrebonne v. Blackburn, 624
F.2d 1363, 1370 (5th Cir. 1980).
73. 393 So. 2d 1278 (La. 1981).
74. But see State v. Cain, 382 So. 2d 936 (La. 1980).
75. CRIMINAL CODE: LA R.S. 40:971(B)(1)(f) (1950 & Supp. 1973).
76. See the court's discussion, 393 So. 2d at 1280.
77. State v. Tilley, 400 So. 2d 1363 (La. 1981).
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the accused's best interest then individualized treatment would be
the more appropriate choice. Where public policy demands a deter-
rent sentence"8 then its exact length must be calculated. "The
seriousness of the offence will be considered in relation to cases of
greater and less gravity ... and eventually a sentence will be deter-
mined bearing some relationship to the accused's culpability.""8 In
both cases, Tilley and Saunders, the availability of individualized
treatment-rehabilitation programs-was especially appealing; the
disproportionately exorbitant sentence further augmented the
defendants' cases.
The character of the defendant's record should influence the ini-
tial sentencing decisions beyond the mere superficial allowance or-
dinarily given for the presence or absence of prior convictions." If
the offender has a previous record for offenses of one type but is be-
ing sentenced for an offense of a different category, then his prior
convictions should have less influence on the sentencing decision. In
State v. Saunders" the defendant's five prior convictions for issuing
worthless checks greatly influenced the trial court in sentencing the
defendant to the maximum term for altering a prescription.2 The
supreme court suggested that the defendant be placed on super-
vised probation. Saunders' present criminal conduct was under
strong provocation" and could be considered as an "isolated act out
of character, rather than an extension of the offender's criminal ac-
tivity into a hitherto unexplored field."8 In State v. Tilley, 5 the
defendant had two prior. DWI convictions and a conviction for con-
tributing to the delinquency of a juvenile. Neither of these offenses
requires a criminal state of mind, and their effect on the present
sentencing decision should have been minimal.8 On the other hand,
78. In many circumstances the social interest protected by incarceration of the ac-
cused greatly outweighs the goal of individualized sentencing. Breach of the public
trust by elected officials, continuing criminal activity of recidivists, and violent crime
are just a few examples. See note 59, supra.
79. D. THOMAS, supra note 48, at 4.
80. State v. Daranda, 398 So. 2d 1053, (La. 1981) (Dennis, J., dissenting); State v.
Spano, 380 So. 2d 620 (La. 1980) (Dennis and Watson, JJ., concurring).
81. 393 So. 2d 1278 (La. 1981).
82. See text at note 73, supra.
83. Saunders was under a doctor's care for various work-related injuries and
became addicted to pain killers after extensive back surgery and the subsequent ampu-
tation of his hand. 393 So. 2d at 1280.
84. D. THOMAS, supra note 79, at 178.
85. 400 So. 2d 1363 (La. 1981). See text at note 68, supra.
86. But see State v. Beavers, 382 So. 2d 943 (La. 1980), where the defendant's
sentence of teh years imprisonment for his fourth DWI conviction within a five year
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the legitimacy of habitual offender laws are well recognized and
they serve substantial state interests in supressing criminal con-
duct."7 But in cases where a defendant has a prior record of criminal
convictions that falls short of the application of special interest
legislation, his record should be critically, examined to avoid increas-
ing the sentence simply because he is perceived as an undesirable
social element.88
Thus far the supreme court has been disinclined to find a
sentence excessive which was imposed on a violent offender, even to
the extent of not remanding the case for failure to comply with the
sentencing provisions of article 894.1. In non-violent cases, the
supreme court will remand if the mandate of 894.1 is not met, but
the factual circumstances must clearly indicate an abuse of discre-
tion by the trial judge before the supreme court will declare the
sentence excessive; moreover, the actual term of imprisonment must
approach the legislative maximum. Furthermore, if all the "ex-
cessive penalty" cases are quantified, a significant majority can be
categorized as drug cases-victimless crimes. These constitutional
limits formed by the supreme court may at first appear quite nar-
row, but the present structured and consistent review procedure
forms a foundation for a broader scope of review in the future.
The two most recent supreme court opinions bearing upon the issue
of excessive penalties proscribe upper sentencing limits which
are binding upon the trial court on resentencing. These opinions
may mark the beginning of a new trend which will be followed by
the circuit courts of appeal when they begin hearing criminal ap-
peals."8 The limits imposed by State v. Williams" and State v.
period was upheld. Here the defendant's prior record showed a continual course of
repeated criminal conduct.
87. See Rummell v. Estelle, 445 U.S. at 284-85; Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554
(1967).
88. The English courts go one step further in their examination of the prior
record of the accused. Sentencing policies in England allow a "gap" in the defendant's
record to serve as a mitigating circumstance.
[T]he [clourt makes allowance for the fact that the appellant has not committed of-
fenses during a period of time since his last release and has made efforts to live a
stable life. . . . Where the subsequent offence appears more as [a] determined
return to criminal behavior, the existence of a period without conviction is likely
to be ignored.
D. THOMAS, supra note 48, at 181.
89. See note 5, supra.
90. - So. 2d - (La. 1981).
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Tilley' were controversial among the supreme court justices" and
will undoubtedly receive a cold reception in the lower courts. The
defendant in Williams was the least culpable participant in an
armed robbery, yet received the most severe sentence. On remand,
the trial judge's discretion was limited by the supreme court's
holding that "a sentence of more than fifteen years ... in this case
would be constitutionally excessive.""3 Correspondingly, in Tilley the
supreme court viewed the range of constitutionally acceptable
sentences to be between "the statutory minimum to as much as ten
years."9' Rather than merely declaring a criminal sentence to be ex-
cessive and remanding for resentencing the supreme court has
begun to quantify the limits of constitutionality. This potential trend
is possibly an indiciation of the supreme court's dissatisfaction with
the reaction of trial courts to past sentencing problems.
Conclusion
The historical progression of judicially imposed safeguards on
the sentencing process was a product of modernizing standards of
criminal justice. Criminal defendants in Louisiana now can have the
propriety of their criminal sentences reviewed. An effective process
of review must be based on objective standards. Sentence review
based on less than equitable criteria subverts the goals of the
sentencing guidelines system in two ways. First it perpetuates the
disparity problem because the review process becomes arbitrary; in
addition, the lack of uniformity fails to provide the trial court with
any guidance for future sentencing problems. Properly used, the ap-
pellate review of sentences serves as a safeguard against arbitrary
and capricious application of criminal sanctions.
The sentencing guidelines system in Louisiana is still in its in-
fancy. Primarily, the supreme court has been concerned with utiliz-
ing Code of Criminal Procedure article 894.1 to its fullest extent.
The large number of cases remanded to comply with article 894.1
could be reduced by the inclusion of pre-sentence reports in the ap-
pellate record. A disorganized and textually insufficient record can-
not be reviewed, either for the sentence imposed or any other
91. 400 So. 2d 1363 (La. 1981).
92. Justices Marcus, Blanche, and Lemmon were of the opinion that the trial
judge's sentencing discretion on remand should not be constrained by the supreme
court's upper sentencing limits. See 400 So. 2d at 1368; _ So. 2d at -.
93. -.. So. 2d at.___
94. 400 So. 2d at 1368.
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assignment of error. When the record is complete, the functional
usefulness of the sentencing guidelines system can operate. These
sentencing guidelines do not remove the sentencing discretion from
the hands of the trial judge. Discretion is'present throughout our
criminal justice system; indeed, it is desirable if we are to have in-
dividualized justice. But discretion should be based on tangible facts
and guided by a framework of rational and equitable policies. The
policy formation process requires the cooperation of all trial judges;
without such cooperation sentencing practices are subjectively con-
trolled and discretion, which could be useful, can become despotic and
variable.
In the past, Louisiana's sentence appeal '.system was ad-
ministratively overworked. Cases were remanded to comply with ar-
ticle 894.1 only to be subsequently re-appealed. The record of
sentencing factors was often just as incomplete as on original ap-
peal. Limiting the sentencing range, as was recently done in
Williams and Tilley, hopefully will foster judicial economy and
greater uniformity in sentencing. If the court is to function in its.
role as a guardian over the sentencing process, then this practice
must be encouraged. The trial judge is frequently without the
benefit of an overall state-wide picture of sentencing practices and
policies. Often inappropriate demographic and geographic factors in-
fluence his sentencing decision. If the sentence is simply vacated
and remanded, the trial judge might impose a lesser sentence, the
same sentence, or even a greater sentence.
The lower appellate courts will undoubtedly relieve much of the
burden of criminal appeals bearing upon the supreme court. 5
However, efforts to diminish the inequity in sentencing practices
may be frustrated continually by conditions beyond the judiciary's
control. Judges are often less qualified to individualize the ap-
propriate social sanction for each defendant. Sociologists and
penologists are probably more attuned to the factors which control
sentencing decisions. The supreme court's efforts to establish a
state-wide sentencing policy are hampered when individual judges
have no policy consensus. Each of these countervailing forces can be
abated or eliminated by removing the review of sentences from
within the jurisdiction of the appellate courts to the hands of a
quasi-administrative agency.
Various commentators have suggested the numerous advantages
95. See note 5, supra.
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which would accrue from a sentencing commission." The commission
would act as the agency for sentence review in place of the supreme
court and the court of appeals. In addition to reviewing decisions,
the commission could "continually reevaluate the guidelines
themselves, ensuring that they comported with evolving sentencing
policy in the state.""1 Furthermore, the sentencing commission could
perform an invaluable research function by "the collection, analysis,
and dissemination of data concerning the deterrent effectiveness of
various sentencing alternatives."98 The commission could even be
empowered to establish sentence ranges within the limits already
set by the legislature." The judiciary is already overburdened with
its present constitutional obligations and cannot provide the con-
tinual monitoring which any practical sentencing guidelines system
requires. The commission, with a qualified staff, would collect and
analyze sentencing data; disseminate the data into policy statements
and communicate that policy to the judicial, legislative, and ex-
ecutive branches of government.
The present practice of sentence review is an effort to improve
a once remote and disorganized aspect of our criminal justice pro-
cess. The goal of building a statewide body of sentencing policy
should not be abandoned because the means to achieve that end
becomes inappropriate. The future of sentencing reform requires
that the goal be maintained, but its achievement must be by a dif-
ferent path. The creation of a sentencing commission represents a
step in the right direction.
Erick V. Anderson
96. See Coffee, The Repressed Issues of Sentencing: Accountability, Predictabil-
ity, and Equality in the Era of the Sentencing Commission, 66 GEO. L.J. 975 (1978);
Singer, In Favor of "Presumptive Sentences" Set by a Sentencing Commission, 24
CRIME & DELINQUENCY 401, 418-19 (1978); Zalman, A Commission Model of Sentencing,
53 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 266 (1977). See also Douglas & Barnes, What Review Boards
Are Doing About the Unjust Sentence, 19 JUDGE'S J. 16 (1980).
97. J. KRESS, supra note 1, at 42.
98. Id.
99. The commission's guidelines would not be the same as determinate sentencing,
as they would have effect only on the trial judge's discretion and would not be binding
regulations. See Gardner, supra note 10.
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